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Abstract 
In this paper we develop tools for understanding political agency and political events as they 
unfold contextually in everyday life. We discuss alternative understandings of the subject so 
as to grasp the scope of the subject’s autonomy as the ground for political subjectivity. We 
conceive of political agency in terms of subjectivity related to subject positions offered in the 
flux of everyday life. To bring together political subject and action we conceptualize the 
topological settings of political agency in terms of polis. To illustrate the analytical potential 
of our approach we analyze a sequence in a movie by Ingmar Bergman. 
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Subject, action and polis: Theorizing political agency 
 
 
I Introduction 
 
Radical expansion in the notion of politics over the past two to three decades has brought the 
question of political agency to the fore in human geography. In present understanding 
political agency is not restricted to participation in social movements or institutional political 
processes but, rather, it refers to a variety of individual and collective, official and mundane, 
rational and affective, and human and non-human ways of acting, affecting and impacting 
politically (e.g. McDowell, 1992; Gibson-Graham, 1994; Katz, 1996; Flint, 2003; Hobson, 
2007; Barnett, 2008; Oosterlynck, 2010; Braun and Whatmore, 2010; Lestrelin, 2011). 
Agency is considered an inseparable element of political geographical struggles and events 
because, as Kevin Cox and Murray Low (2003: 601) put it, “it is through agency that 
contradictions potentially get suspended and change occurs”. 
There is now a burgeoning literature discussing ‘the political’ or political subjectivity in 
general, or assessing political agency in the context of particular political struggles. This 
scholarship has shown political agency to be a highly contested and multifaceted concept (e.g. 
Featherstone, 2003; Popke, 2004; Staeheli and Kofman, 2004; Thomas, 2009; Wright, 2010; 
Sharp, 2011). Yet, despite some calls for more work on the topic, attempts to theorize 
political agency in its own right remain scarce (Domosh, 1998; Agnew, 2003; Kuus, 2009). 
Stressing the importance of grasping agency as distinctively political, John Agnew contends 
that without this critical insight analyses may end up presuming political outcomes, so that 
“[p]olitics is already determined before anyone engages in it” (Agnew, 2003: 604). 
Explicitly addressing this problematic, this paper is an outgrowth of a nearly decade-
long interest in the political agency of human beings whose agency is often seen to fall 
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outside the realm of politics, or whose political roles and actions are considered when 
prompted by contingencies such as the war or social unrest (see Kallio 2007; Kallio and 
Häkli, 2010, 2011a). Our interest was initially set in motion by what then seemed a simple 
and innocent question. Why, indeed, are children typically excluded from the concerns of 
political theory, to the point that the mere idea of introducing children into political theory 
makes both children and politics appear outlandish? We came to realize that even when seen 
as partisans to political events, children are often apprehended in ways that tend to rob them 
of any spontaneous political agency that cannot be traced back to what is readily known to be 
politically relevant in adult terms (Kallio and Häkli, 2011b; see also Skelton and Valentine, 
2003; Bosco, 2010). 
Given the title of this paper, and the vast tradition of political philosophy and theory 
devoted to making sense of what is politics, children’s agency may seem a rather marginal 
concern. Childhood is, after all, but a passing stage in human development towards adulthood, 
which supposedly is the proper domain of the political (e.g. Hyman, 1959; Niemi and 
Hepburn, 1995; Highton and Wolfinger, 2001; McLeod and Shah, 2009). However, as 
suggested by Chris Philo and Fiona Smith (2003), there are some grounds for arguing that 
precisely the opposite is the case, and that childhood is a particularly opportune condition 
through which to approach the question of political agency in general (see also Kallio, 2007; 
Elwood and Mitchell, 2012; Bartos, 2012). First, as hinted at above, it is precisely our interest 
in children’s political agency that has kept us from being content with standard definitions of 
what counts as politics. As a matter of fact, when political theories are brought to bear on 
children, the issue turns out highly complicated and problematic (e.g. Valentine, 1997; 
Mitchell, 2006; Ruddick, 2007; Bragg, 2007; Thomas, 2009; Skelton, 2010). Second, taking 
children’s agency seriously demands us to ask questions that go beyond those prevailing 
certainties that may hamper novel ways of assessing politics as an integral part of people’s 
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everyday lives, that is, politics as it unfolds in the world around us. It is for this task that we 
seek to develop conceptual tools in this paper. 
We are aware of the magnitude of the theoretical challenge that our title poses and 
therefore feel compelled to justify and limit the scope of our effort and thereby indicate where 
we consider our conceptual tools to be most valid. At the outset we must point out that what 
follows is not intended as a contribution to political philosophy. Our competence would not 
allow this even if we had such aspirations, and currently there are several important strands of 
scholarship in human geography devoted to philosophical approaches to politics (e.g. Massey, 
1999; Elden, 2003; Thrift, 2004, 2008; Popke, 2006; Marston et al., 2007; Dewsbury, 2007; 
Barnett, 2008, 2012a; Woodward et al., 2012; Dikeç, 2012). This said, in teasing out the 
meanings of the political we will utilize the thought of (political) philosophers such as 
Hannah Arendt (1958), Axel Honneth (1995, 2007) and Georg Herbert Mead (1934). Our 
ambition, nevertheless, lies in developing tools that facilitate the analysis of contextual 
political events, and for this purpose political philosophy debate is an instrument, not a goal. 
Secondly, we do not propose our work as a contribution to political theory in abstract. 
While this would be a tempting goal in itself, we are too aware of the many fundamental lines 
of division in the existing political thought to attempt a synthesis or an overarching theoretical 
treatment of the political in all its aspects (see for example Taylor, 1982; Howell, 1993; 
Barnett, 2004; Bassett, 2008; Anderson, 2012). Such an effort, we contend, would by 
necessity remain too detached from the flux of everyday life to serve as a starting point for 
concrete political analysis. In Clive Barnett’s (2012b: 679) words, rather than developing 
“more and more elaborate ontologies of the political” we want to focus “attention on the 
phenomenologies of political action”. Hence, while we remain highly sympathetic towards 
efforts to radically rethink, reform, and even “politicize” political theory by authors such as 
Jacques Rancière (1995), Jean-Luc Nancy (2000) and Adriana Cavarero (2002), we 
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nevertheless consider political theory valuable only to the point that it can serve as a tool for 
understanding events and circumstances in their particularity (see Castree, 2004; Sparke, 
2006; Gökar?ksel and Secor, 2009; Staeheli, 2010; Agnew 2011). 
To meet the challenge of bridging conceptual work on political agency with the 
phenomenology of political events, we consider it important to bring in the question of 
context both socially and spatially. Sensitivity to the contextual open-endedness of everyday 
political agency means that we do not necessarily know what issues, experiences, events or 
actions are, or become, political in a given situation. Yet, while this expands the notion of 
politics, we do not propose that everything is, or should be seen as, politics (Dean, 2000). Still 
less do we seek to change its definition simply to make the word better fit our purposes, as 
Cresswell (2012) argues is the case with some NRT theorization. We understand politics in 
Arendtian sense “as a form of activity concerned with addressing problems of living together 
in a shared world of plurality and difference” so that “‘the political’ refers to the problematic 
of coexistence and association, and that the space of this sharing is constituted by active 
agents” (Barnett, 2012b: 679). 
We understand politics as a relational phenomenon, so that what makes things 
politically significant in each case depends on the situation and context at hand. For us 
politics is about matters of importance, whether these be in the context of the state policy or a 
person’s everyday life. In the former case political issues are publically discussed and thus 
broadly acknowledged, whereas in the latter case only people involved may know what the 
stakes are. Either way, political agency is prompted when matters of importance are 
challenged or called into question because then those involved have something at stake in 
them. Hence, to really apprehend what is political in a given issue, event or action we must be 
attentive to the following question: In relation to which situation or site, for what group, 
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community or assemblage, this or that question begins to matter? In other words, in which 
polis a given agency is constituted as political? 
We realize that in outlining the relevant socio-spatial contexts of everyday political 
agency in terms of polis we are mobilizing a concept that may seem parochial and burdened 
by its uses to discuss ancient political life, and thus incapable of addressing contemporary 
matters (cf. Marshall, 2010). However, we share Raymond Williams’ (1983: 21) conviction 
that while original meanings of words are an important source of etymological insight, these 
meanings remain open-ended and thus subject to historical and contextual change. We find 
particularly appealing some recent attempts at freeing the idea of polis from its city-statist and 
territorial connotations and viewing it rather as the relational realm of everyday politics (Ely, 
1996; Elden, 2005; Dikeç, 2005; Marshall, 2010). In this spirit we have found an enlivened 
sense of polis a useful conceptual tool for capturing the many contextual and relational 
dimensions that pertain to political agency (see also Cavarero, 2002; Todd, 2011). For us the 
phenomenology of politics springs from matters of importance in polis, however composed. 
The paper proceeds as follows. First we outline our conception of the subject so as to 
arrive at a tentative understanding of the possibility and scope of autonomy as the ground of 
political subjectivity (see also Dikeç, 2005; Wright, 2010; Vacchelli, 2011). We then seek to 
understand the conditions of possibility for political action. To this end we theorize the 
subject’s relative autonomy as conditioned by but not reducible to the subject’s 
intersubjective constitution. Third, we bring together political subject and action by theorizing 
the social and spatial settings of political agency in terms of polis. To show how political 
agency can be understood as the coming together of subject, action and polis, we briefly 
sketch out a scene from the partly autobiographical movie Fanny and Alexander written and 
directed by Ingmar Bergman (1982). With this illustration and some examples from our 
ongoing school ethnography, we work out in detail and extend our earlier assessment of 
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children’s political agency unfolding in relation to various subject positions offered in the flux 
of everyday life (e.g. Kallio and Häkli 2011b). We conclude by discussing the limitations and 
benefits of our conceptual tools in efforts to capture politics as experienced and practiced in 
everyday life by children and adults alike. 
  
II The subject’s autonomy and subjectivity 
 
The question concerning the ontological status of the subject is a conundrum all human 
sciences have had to contend with. Unsurprisingly, it is also the source of many divisions 
between incommensurable philosophical and theoretical positions (e.g. Lacan, 1960/1977; 
Sartre, 1966; Levi-Strauss, 1969; Rawls, 1971; Badiou, 2009). For us it is neither practical 
nor feasible to deal with the question in all its aspects but there are some interrelated issues 
concerning the status of the subject that are highly consequential for the purposes of this paper 
and must be discussed at some length. These include the question of what is the subject, can it 
be conceived of as autonomous, and how does it relate with subjectivity and identity. 
We may begin mapping the terrain of the subject by sketching out a continuum between 
two extremes. At one end stands the subject as self-sufficient, enduring and sovereign 
individual, from which all consciousness and action springs. At the other end the subject 
dissolves into a non-sovereign product of social and discursive construction, devoid of any 
stability, autonomy or unity of self. Both extremes, of course, are unsatisfactory in the light of 
contemporary philosophies of the subject. In the first case the subject continues to be a 
“refuge for older psychological and romantic models of the self”, an atomized individual of 
modern political subjectivism (Wetherell, 2008: 78). The latter position, again, fails in 
responding to the simple question posed by Paul Ricoeur: “who is ‘I’, when the subject says 
he or she is nothing?” (Ricoeur, 1991: 78). He insists on the distinction between self (ipse) 
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and identity (idem) in much the same way as Hannah Arendt distinguishes between the 
uniqueness of being whereby “nobody is ever the same as anyone else who ever lived, lives or 
will live” (subject as ‘who’) and identity as a response to the question of what these unique 
beings are like (subject as ‘what’) (Arendt, 1958: 8). 
Arendt’s work on the uniqueness of the subject is appealing because in showing how 
unique being is intertwined with the social constitution of identities she escapes both the 
foundational position of self-sufficient individualism and the anti-foundational overemphasis 
on decentered fragmentary identity. We will come back to this aspect of subjectivity as it 
pertains to political agency in the next section. Before this it is necessary to examine more 
closely the two opposite ways of relating the subject with identity. 
There are two major strands of scholarship that have explicitly theorized the relationship 
between subject and identity in a way that is illuminative for our purposes. Within both it is 
broadly accepted that identities are constituted intersubjectively but in questioning what this 
means to the ontological status of the subject, they tend to move to opposite directions. The 
first scholarship can best be captured in terms of post-structuralist conceptions of identity (e.g. 
Butler, 1990; Young, 1990; Benhabib, 1992), whereas the second operates variably under the 
rubric of the theory, ethics or politics of recognition (e.g. Taylor, 1994; Honneth, 1995, 2007; 
Fraser, 2000). 
Judith Butler’s (1990, 1997, 2003) psychoanalytically attuned work on the role of 
performative repetition in constituting gendered identities has been influential across the 
social science disciplines. To account for subjectivity she explores the forces of domination 
that operate through the subject’s attachment to identity categories given by regulatory 
regimes. For Butler to exist socially is to desire recognition offered by attachment to social 
categories that thereby come to constitute the subject as fundamentally vulnerable to 
subjugation. In the face of this “psychic subjection”, individuals are always already 
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“subjected or undergoing ‘subjectivation’” (Butler, 1997: 11). Thus, in her reading of Hegel 
Butler leans clearly towards an intrapsychic account of self-enslavement as a logic of 
subjection: “What Hegel implies [is that] … the subject will attach to pain rather than not 
attach at all” (Butler, 1997: 61).  
Butler’s work on subjectification is valuable in addressing the ways in which 
discursively structured subject positions condition political agency. However, her emphasis 
on the individual as the site of intersubjective relatedness to others is not without 
consequences for her understanding of political agency in general. As Amy Allen (2006) 
points out, in probing into the possibility of recognition predicated on our vulnerability and 
dependency upon others, Butler ultimately fails to appreciate the dynamic and potentially 
non-subordinating aspects of human intersubjectivity (Allen, 2006). Kathy Magnus goes as 
far as to say that Butler employs “a reactive, minimalist, and unduly negative notion of 
agency. We are left with a subject who is only as subjected” (Magnus, 2006: 87). 
Lois McNay (2008) sums up much recent criticism of the undue precedence given to the 
role of categories and discourse in subject formation in stating that such theories “cannot 
explain certain subjective dimensions of agency such as will, self-understanding and intention 
which are crucial to explaining some of the political implications of action” (McNay, 2008: 
195; see also Fraser, 1995; Campbell, 2001; Allen, 2006; Vasterling, 2010). One reason to 
this omission lies in what Adriana Cavarero (2002) calls post-structuralist theories’ 
preoccupation with the what-ness of being at the expense of the Arendtian question of who 
each one is – the “totally unique irreplaceable subjectivity” (Allen, 2006: 217). It is with this 
concept of the subject in mind that we now turn to theories of recognition in quest for an 
expanded notion of the subject’s autonomy, subjectivity and agency. 
Contemporary theories of recognition are inspired by the idea of the ‘struggle for 
recognition’ that Hegel developed partly as a critique of the Hobbesian concept of the state of 
Authors’ copy. The original article has been published in Progress in Human Geography (first 
published on Jan. 22, 2013, doi: 10.1177/0309132512473869). For citation, please use the original. 
 
10 
 
nature and its ‘war of all against all’. Whereas Hobbes posited that the conflictual state of 
nature is overcome through the social contract, Hegel saw that the struggle in itself is a 
productive force conducive to moral growth. For Hegel, subjects depend on mutual 
recognition for their existence as individuated selves and therefore the struggle for recognition 
is at once the source of individual autonomy and the foundation of sociality (Honneth, 1995).  
With his philosophical model Hegel sought to describe the formative process leading to 
‘ethical life’ characterized by the absence of misrecognition. Similar aspirations have fuelled 
contemporary theories of recognition which are expressly motivated by attempts to redress 
forms of injustice based on misrecognition or withheld recognition of individual or group 
identity. In Charles Taylor’s words, “our identity is partly shaped by recognition or its 
absence, often by the misrecognition of others, and so a person or group of people can suffer 
real damage, real distortion, if the people or society around them mirror back to them a 
confining or demeaning or contemptible picture of themselves” (Taylor, 1994: 25). 
Recognition, then, is not just a matter of due respect or courtesy but a vital human need 
which, unfulfilled, leads to serious grieving and may result in identity political conflicts. 
For Axel Honneth (1995, 2007) struggle for recognition is a form of ethical life serving 
as the model for a society that meets the demands for recognition. Ethical life, in this regard, 
refers to the “entirety of intersubjective conditions that can be shown to serve as necessary 
preconditions for individual self-realization” (Honneth, 1995: 173). Ideally, individuals come 
to realize themselves in the positive terms of self-confidence, self-respect and self-esteem that 
result from “undistorted and unrestricted recognition” by an approving and encouraging other 
(Honneth, 1995: 171). Where this fails to happen, experience of disrespect is likely to occur, 
opening up a potential for social conflict (Honneth, 1995: 163). 
While positing in Hegelian terms that the subject is constituted intersubjectively, 
theories of recognition must nevertheless retain a degree of autonomy to subjective being. 
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This is because of the import they place on the experience of recognition as the basis of 
individuals’ and groups’ well-being. For Taylor’s point about a person’s need to have her or 
his identity rightly recognized by others, there has to be a locus for experience that can not be 
ontologically collapsed into identity, however intersubjectively negotiated. Similarly, 
Honneth’s claim that ethical life is based on possibilities for individuals and groups to 
experience recognition, presupposes a subject distinct from the “intersubjective structure of 
personal identity” – otherwise it would be impossible for a person to determine whether a 
given act of recognition is just or not (Honneth, 1995: 173; see also Anderson & Honneth, 
2005). Hence, for recognition theorists the subject’s autonomy is not about individual 
sovereignty but rather about the possibility for being in relation to one’s identity through 
subjectivity. To further understand how this faculty may feed into relational politics (things at 
stake in matters of importance) we now turn to Mead’s thought on human agency. 
 
III Subjectivity as the condition of possibility of political agency 
 
In developing his theory of recognition Honneth appropriates George Herbert Mead’s (1934) 
thought on intersubjectivity as the foundation of identity formation, so as to embed Hegel’s 
metaphysical theoretical model into “empirical events within the social world” (Honneth, 
1995: 68). For this project Mead’s account of the intersubjective constitution of ‘me’ has 
much to offer. Honneth accepts Mead’s theoretical insight according to which “individuals 
can only become conscious of themselves in the object-position”, that is, “a subject can only 
acquire a consciousness of itself to the extent to which it learns to perceive its own action 
from the symbolically represented second-person perspective” (Honneth, 1995: 74-75). This 
is how ‘me’ emerges as the subject’s social self that, importantly, also functions as a dynamic 
source of moral development. In practical engagements with others, an individual acquires 
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the normative point of view of its interaction partners and applies their moral values to make 
sense of its own actions. As one’s sphere of interaction broadens from childhood’s narrow 
circles to cover the whole society, one’s ‘me’ comes to reflect the social norms of 
‘generalized other’ needed for socially accepted membership in one’s community (Honneth, 
1995). 
Had Honneth contended with merely appropriating Mead’s account of how moral 
subjects become mature members of their societies through an intersubjective constitution of 
‘me’, his theory of recognition would bear close reminiscence to determinist understandings 
of the subject. Yet, in contrast to the Butlerian concept of the subject’s psyche as always 
constituted in dialogue with social norms (Butler, 1997: 102), Honneth uses Mead’s 
conception of the ‘I’ to account for “the creative deviations with which, in our everyday 
action, we ordinarily react to social obligations” (Honneth, 1995: 81). For Honneth the 
subject’s ‘I’ is the source of everyday practical spontaneity, and “unconscious force … [that 
is] the collection site for all the inner impulses expressed in involuntary reactions to social 
challenges” (Honneth, 1995: 81). What makes Mead’s conception of the subject’s ‘I’ so 
potent for understanding human political agency is precisely the way in which it explains why 
there may be experiences of incompatibility with the norms of the social environment, 
experiences that cause “one to put one’s own ‘me’ into doubt” (Honneth, 1995: 82). The 
subject’s ‘I’, then, is the source of its relative autonomy from its intersubjectively constituted 
social identity ‘me’, and subjectivity is the dynamic relation between them. 
While we endorse Honneth’s reading of Mead’s classic Mind, Self and Society to the 
extent that it provides an account of the subject’s relative autonomy, we find ourselves in 
agreement with Patchen Markell (2007) who detects a source of problem in Honneth’s 
interpretation of Mead. The problem is partly related to Honneth’s theoretical project which 
contains two aspirations that are difficult to reconcile in a single framework. The analytical 
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aspect of Honneth’s theory of recognition strives to theorize processes of identity formation 
and recognition as they unfold in the world, while the normative aspect seeks to develop 
ethics of recognition as a regulative ideal for an egalitarian society (Deranty and Renault, 
2007; McNay, 2008). This dual mission instills into Honneth’s theory a contradiction between 
the idea of genuine open-endedness and non-directionality of social change (recognition as a 
creative act), and the idea of social change as progress toward ever more correct recognition 
(of some pre-existing traits) (Markell, 2007; see also Rogers 2009). 
Honneth’s attempt to reconcile this contradiction is reflected in his reading of Mead’s 
account of ‘I’ in a way that, as Markell (2007) points out, leads him to map the subject’s ‘I’ 
and ‘me’ directly onto the relationship between an individual and society. Markell (2007) 
traces the roots of this interpretation back to Mead’s own ambiguity regarding the concept of 
‘I’. In his work on intersubjectivity Mead mostly views the ‘I’ in terms of William James’ and 
John Dewey’s pragmatist thought as the subject of presently ongoing and as yet incomplete 
activity, and thus, the source of uncertainty and novelty. According to Mead, the self can only 
ever be experienced as an object and therefore as ‘me’, whereas the ‘I’ is the elusive ongoing 
agency that the agent can not experience directly precisely because ‘I’ is not an object 
(Markell, 2007). Hence, while ‘me’ is routinely reflected upon as the object of past and future 
actions, the ‘I’ exists only in the present tense, responding open-endedly to situations: 
 
Even in the case of a person who is ‘simply carrying out the process of 
walking,’ [Mead] suggests, ‘the very taking of his next steps’ 
nevertheless puts him in a situation that is ‘in a certain sense novel.’ 
The ‘I’ is, one might say, a name for this irreducibility of the response 
to the antecedent situation. (Markell, 2007: 123) 
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Together with the understanding of ‘me’ as the subject’s socially constituted self through 
which one relates to the exigencies and norms of the social world, the Meadian concept of ‘I’ 
clearly represents an important source of the subject’s relative autonomy that we consider 
essential for understanding political agency. The subject as ‘I’ explains why individuals can 
not be thoroughly reduced to the effects of intersubjective and discursive constitution. Yet, as 
the autonomy is relative to the subject’s social self, it does not lead back to the liberal notion 
of the autonomous self-sufficient subject. 
We adopt this insight as the basis of our conception of the subject because it paves way 
for an understanding of political agency at once socially conditioned and open-ended 
(Colapietro, 2006). We agree with McNay (2008) who concludes that Honneth’s theory of 
recognition has contributed positively to our understanding of subjectivity by underlining its 
dialogical nature and ineluctably contextual, situated and practical generation. These are all 
features that classical pragmatism has helped foreground. Thus we suggest that with a 
restored Meadian conception of subjectivity we can develop an understanding of political 
agency from the perspective of the lived reality of embodied social relations. To this end we 
now move to discussing how we conceive of political agency and its spatiality in terms of 
polis. 
 
IV Political agency in polis 
 
We understand ‘the political’ phenomenologically as activity related to problems of living 
together in and through the spaces that this sharing constitutes. Furthermore, we see political 
subjectivity as vested in the dialogue between the subject’s ‘I’ and ‘me’, neither of which can 
exist without the other. Here the ‘I’ refers to the subject’s agency as an ongoing doing and 
existing in the world here and now, the one unique presence in the world that each and every 
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living being has (Arendt, 1958; Cavarero, 2002). For human beings, this presence turns upon 
reflection into an object of consciousness that bears the characteristics of ‘me’, ranging from a 
coherent understanding of oneself as a person to a mere fleeting sense of being. Simply put, 
‘I’ refers to seeing itself, not to the objectified subject that does the looking, as expressed in 
the sentence “I see”. 
The idea of subjectivity as a dialogue between ‘I’ and ‘me’ implies that without the ‘I’ 
there would not be agency and without the ‘me’ there would not be human agency. We 
subscribe to the view according to which non-human actors represent a politically relevant 
form of agency but maintain that non-human agency is markedly different from human 
agency precisely because non-humans (or more-than-humans) do not constitute a dialogue 
between ‘I’ and ‘me’. In Arendt’s (1958) terms, this dialogue refers to human subjectivity, or 
the subject as who, whereas the negotiation concerning the subject’s identity denotes the 
subject as what. We are always both who we are and what we are. This marks human agency 
apart from other forms of politically relevant action (cf. Hinchliffe et al., 2007; Hobson, 2007; 
Panelli, 2010). 
When it comes to the geographies of political agency, ‘I’ and ‘me’ map out differently. 
Through the subject’s ‘me’ all human beings relate to the social worlds in which their political 
agencies unfold. As an intersubjectively constituted social self, ‘me’ has both a history and an 
orientation toward the future, and thus existence beyond the here and now. It is the object of 
consciousness when the subject reflects upon or talks about itself, but importantly, the 
reflection is carried out by the subject’s ‘I’. The subject’s ‘me’, therefore, owes the powers of 
its agency to the ’I’ that animates it, yet the ‘I’ has no social existence without the ‘me’ that 
gives the subject all the characteristics that make it a potent political actor. 
This readily points to the importance of contextuality for political agency. If human 
beings only existed as ‘I’ subjects, we could conceive of the contextuality of political agency 
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simply in the situational terms of here and now. All politics would then unfold in relation to 
the conditions and other subjects presently at hand. We consider the recent interest in 
immediacy and immanence a welcome attempt to capture such political geographies in a 
novel way (e.g. Horton and Kraftl, 2006; Dewsbury, 2007; Woodward et al., 2012). However, 
as human political agency takes place through the subject’s ‘me’, the constitution of which 
reflects a broad array of different contexts and situations, the contextuality of political agency 
takes on much more temporal and spatial complexity (Mitchell and Elwood, 2012). This 
complexity we wish to capture by the term polis that we use to refer to the different kinds of 
spatial and temporal settings where our political agency may arise and unfold – contexts in 
which we have something at stake (see also Cavarero, 2002; Dikeç, 2005; Elden, 2005).  
Because we understand politics relationally, the relevance of polis in our theorization of 
political agency goes well beyond the idea of a scene or arena for political action. Indeed, it is 
only in relation to a polis that this or that matter will gain significance and become political. 
Hence, politics is fundamentally social just as the ‘me’, through which it unfolds, is 
fundamentally intersubjective. This is an important aspect of political agency, underlining that 
politics is not about the whims and vagaries of the liberal sovereign individual but, rather, the 
subjectivity that empowers political agency is conditioned by the social and spatial settings 
where matters of importance get politicized. Whether shaped as a setting for institutional or 
everyday politics, however spatially constituted, polis both engenders and conditions political 
agency. 
For outlining the complex contextuality of political agency it is useful to begin by 
considering topography and topology as two different kinds of configurations of spatiality 
(e.g. Mol and Law, 1994; Giaccaria and Minca, 2011; Allen, 2011a). Topography refers to the 
conventional understanding of space in terms of territories, regions, locations and metric 
distances that can, in principle, be represented cartographically. Disrupting this conventional 
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understanding, topology captures relational and discontinuous space where proximity is 
defined less by distance and more by the intensity and frequency of social relations that shape 
the space (Murdoch, 1997; Law, 2002). Along with Mol and Law (1994), we consider 
topography and topology as complementary rather than alternative understandings of spatial 
relations, neither of which alone provides an all-encompassing account of the spatiality of 
polis. This said, it is reasonable to assume that different forms of political agency depend on 
and enact different spatialities so that for some processes topographic or regional spaces are 
more pertinent whereas others are better understood topologically.  
A topographic polis, such as a voting district, is the result of practices held together in 
relatively stable associations by the social and material networks of the institutional political 
system. A topological polis, instead, is formed by the bundle of significant others, 
communicative relations and material objects that make up the discontinuous ecology of one’s 
concerns. The latter configuration owes some of its endurance to the conventions provided by 
the topographic ‘world as we know it’, and conversely, the territorially constituted political 
communities are certainly enmeshed with the topological relations of polis. But these 
intersections notwithstanding, there are important differences in the kinds of political agencies 
that unfold topographically and topologically.  
Whether understood as an ancient city-state, a modern nation-state or any other 
territorial frame for politics, the topographic polis represents the more conventional 
understanding of political space. It keeps informing most institutional political practices, 
including policies that seek to promote children’s political agency, and also many studies that 
assess these processes (e.g. Such and Walker, 2005; Whitty and Wisby 2007; Evans and 
Spicer, 2008). Hence, when children are given the chance to exercise their right to 
participation in matters concerning them, they tend to be approached as members of a 
particular district (e.g. school, residential, municipal), supporting a specific group or 
Authors’ copy. The original article has been published in Progress in Human Geography (first 
published on Jan. 22, 2013, doi: 10.1177/0309132512473869). For citation, please use the original. 
 
18 
 
candidate (e.g. age group, class mate, school representative), with a certain history of previous 
choices in formal participation, level and success in education and other activities (e.g. 
hobbies), and nationality, ethnicity, race, family, neighborhood, class, gender, and so on 
(Kallio and Häkli, 2011b). All these intersecting identities are part of their constellation of 
‘me’, negotiated in the course of their life histories and reflecting their prevailing and 
changing socio-cultural environments and relationships with others. Beginning from 
childhood and continuing throughout youth, adulthood and old age, many facets of our ‘me’ 
gain significance in the various institutionalized polises of representative democracy we are 
involved in.  
However, while ‘I’ partakes in our becoming members of such polises, keeping our 
agencies open-ended, formal participatory practices such as voting call forth only some 
aspects of our political selves. We can be certain kinds of political agents when participating 
in institutional polises but not all kinds of agents. This is because the institutions of 
representative democracy tend to offer us official, legally grounded, territorially organized, 
norm-bound subject positions that hail us in very particular ways. Thus, for example the 
geographical assumptions pertaining to children’s politics tend to overemphasize locality and 
physical proximity, implying that things near are more important to children than things far 
(e.g. Kyttä, 2002; Murtagh and Murphy, 2011; Said, 2012). However, there is a growing 
literature emphasizing the multiple spatial frames and scales of children’s political agency 
(e.g. Bosco, 2010; Bartos, 2012; Elwood and Mitchell, 2012). These studies have made it 
abundantly clear that the geographies of children’s concerns – their polises – are much more 
complex and malleable than we may have thought. These politics cannot be identified from a 
merely topographical perspective.  
To complement the traditional approaches, we seek to make sense of political agency by 
studying the topological relations influential in people’s everyday lives. While doing this we 
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accept that there are a multitude of topographic settings that continue to be relevant arenas for 
certain forms of political agency. Yet our interest is directed toward the largely unidentified 
political agencies that unfold in topologically constituted polises, politics practiced by their 
least experienced and acknowledgeable members – children. Moreover, as we conceive of 
politics relationally, topological configurations of space seem particularly promising as an 
account of the differentially constituted settings where everyday political agency may unfold. 
We subscribe to John Allen’s view that “topology represents an opportunity for geographers 
to think again about how it is that events elsewhere seem to be folded or woven into the 
political fabric of daily life” (Allen, 2011b: 318). In topological terms, the polis of political 
agency does not exist simply as a continuous physical space – a location, place or region in 
which the agency takes place – but rather it is a space constituted, held together and 
performed by relational intensities configured by what is significant or important for those 
involved (see also Featherstone, 2008; Barnett, 2012b; Secor, 2012).  
To grasp the polis as a non-Euclidean space, it is necessary to begin from the question 
of what constitutes membership in such a polis and how this membership calls forth political 
agency in the flux of everyday life. To offer what can only be a very tentative account for 
these questions, we will turn to a scene from the movie Fanny and Alexander with which we 
seek to show how everyday political agency may unfold in a topological polis. To broaden the 
illustration we discuss some experiences based on our ongoing ethnographic work focusing 
on children’s political agency practiced in relation to particular subject positions they 
encounter in their everyday lives. 
 
V Political struggle over subjectivity 
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Let us first recall how Markell (2007: 129) underlines the role that ‘I’ plays in the open-
ended intersubjective constitution of ‘me’ “located less in [the individuals] than in the world 
they share, in one mode or another, with others”. We find this an important move towards 
understanding the phenomenology of political action with two major consequences. First, 
political agency, and along with it the formation of the first polis in which an individual 
partakes, begins at child birth (see Arendt 1958: 9). Our political agency, then, begins when 
we enter into social relations that animate the dialogue between ‘I’ and ‘me’ and our 
(significant) others. Consequently, our agency in the polis is marked less by the battle 
between some authentic inner self and demands coming from the society, than by the way in 
which we relate subjectively to situations, events and positions offered to us in the course of 
our lives. This seemingly subtle move is important because it shifts the relationality of ‘the 
political’ from within the individual into the social world that the embodied individual 
encounters in multiple different subject positions, either averting, accepting or altering them 
through individual or concerted action (see also Ortner, 1996, 2005; Simonsen, 2007; JT 
Allen, 2008; Gökar?ksel and Secor, 2010). These positions may be set by the demands of a 
particular situated social interaction, or they may be of much more complex origin, reflecting 
particular discursive positionings, action histories, societal processes and future orientations. 
Either way, the space for political agency is opened up by the subjectivity that dwells in the 
space of indeterminacy between the situated agency of our ‘I’ and ‘me’ as our social self. 
With this understanding of the subject we now move on to illustrating our conception of 
political agency. For the sake of clarity, in what follows we refer to the subject’s ‘I’ and ‘me’ 
as always present in the subject as ‘who’ founded on subjectivity that animates human 
political agency. We do this because we consider the distinction analytical, not empirical, and 
thus do not expect to be able to pinpoint ‘I’ isolated from ‘me’ in any particular sequence of 
action. What we can observe instead is the dynamic interplay between the subject as ‘who’ – 
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the unique subjective existence in the world unfolding largely beyond reflection – and the 
subject as ‘what’, the social self negotiated intersubjectively in relation to subject positions 
proposed and available in a particular polis. As we seek to make evident, in empirical analysis 
it is possible to assess how these two facets of the subject animate political agency differently: 
the ‘who’ as based on the relative autonomy of the subject, and the ‘what’ constituted in and 
thus constrained by the social world. 
Let us consider the relationship between Alexander and his stepfather Bishop Vergérus 
as portrayed in a scene from the film Fanny and Alexander (1982). The film is partly 
autobiographical and based on the childhood memories of its writer and director Ingmar 
Bergman. As this is not a documentary film we can not analyze the scene as a depiction of 
real events. However, we consider it a realistic portrayal of a situation that might unfold as 
part of people’s everyday life nearly anywhere and anytime, assuming different forms and 
producing diverse outcomes depending on the polis in question.  
The film is set in Uppsala, Sweden, in the beginning of the 20th century. The story deals 
with the ups and downs of a well-to-do Ekdahl family involved in running a theatre. In the 
center of the story are a 10-year-old Alexander and his little sister Fanny whose parents are 
happily married until things change dramatically with the father Oscar’s sudden death during 
a rehearsal of a theatre play. Shortly thereafter their mother, Emilie, marries Bishop Vergérus 
and takes Fanny and Alexander to live with her in the Bishop’s house. It soon turns out that 
the Bishop is a strict parent and the children end up under his severe rule. He is particularly 
hard on Alexander, trying to teach him his manners in various ways. The episode that follows 
is an example of such encounters between Alexander and the Bishop (Bergman, 1982). 
The scene starts with the stepfather Bishop Vergérus questioning Alexander, 
accompanied by Fanny, in his chambers about an offence toward his person. The Bishop has 
heard from his housekeeper that Alexander keeps telling ghastly stories about him and the 
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circumstances in which his late wife and children had died some years ago. The Bishop asks 
Alexander repeatedly to confess and apologize but Alexander denies systematically any 
wrong doing. He goes as far as to lie about the matter with his hand on the bible even though 
the Bishop explicitly warns him about the consequences of false oath. 
While one might view Alexander’s behavior as naïve and thoughtless, it is clear from 
the episode that he is acting quite intentionally and advisedly to defy the Bishop. For instance, 
he pretends to forget what the Bishop wants him to confess and why he should be punished, 
and instead of trying to get off lightly by falling in with the Bishop’s will, he escalates the 
conflict as well as the punishment that he eventually receives. Yet, until the very end, 
Alexander’s appearance remains polite and well-mannered. 
As the episode proceeds, it becomes ever more apparent that what Alexander and the 
Bishop are struggling over is not the case per se, but something much more profound. At 
stake is nothing less than ‘who’ and ‘what’ Alexander is in this new stepfamily, and who gets 
to define his social self. The Bishop is proposing Alexander a very particular subject position 
as his new son with all the obligations and expectations that follow from a father-son 
relationship. Alexander, again, is clearly indicating that he is uncomfortable with this position 
even though he really can not reject it tout court. The political agency related to this struggle 
can be teased out by focusing on the ways in which Alexander and the Bishop refer to 
themselves and to each other during the episode. 
Appropriately by the standards of the time, Alexander addresses his stepfather 
consistently as the “Bishop”, and he references Alexander either in second person or by 
name.1 The episode begins with the opening line “Alexander, my son”, whereby the Bishop 
sets up the tensioned scene concerning Alexander’s identity. During the Bishop’s questioning 
Alexander first gives only laconic replies denying all accusations but, intimidated by the 
Bishop, he begins to engage in the dialogue, albeit reluctantly. Aggravated by the situation, 
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which only served to underline Alexander’s rejection of his fatherly authority, the Bishop 
reminds him about a conversation concerning morality they had some weeks ago. Again the 
Bishop addresses him as “Alexander, my son”, thus re-proposing him the subject position as 
his son. 
What is ear-catching in the way Alexander responds is how he now talks about himself 
selectively in first and third person. To the Bishop’s surprise, instead of complying with his 
move Alexander denies ever having adopted his moral values by stating that these were not 
agreed in a conversation because “the Bishop spoke and Alexander said nothing”. The 
dialogue continues as follows: 
 
The Bishop: “Said nothing and felt ashamed, perhaps, on account of his lies” 
Alexander: “I’ve grown wiser since then” 
The Bishop: “You mean you lie better” 
Alexander: “More or less”. 
 
Still addressing Alexander as “my son”, but rather agitatedly, the Bishop asks whether 
Alexander really thinks he can besmirch the Bishop’s honor without being punished for it. 
Alexander replies in both first and third persons: “I think the Bishop hates Alexander. That’s 
what I think”. In his final attempt to push Alexander from his stance, the Bishop attests his 
fatherly love toward Alexander, Fanny and their mother while stroking Alexander’s cheek 
with seeming affection. As Alexander keeps quiet, the Bishop gives in to his severity and the 
episode ends with Alexander’s forced confession, punishment by beating and detention in the 
attic.  
We read this scene as an example of political agency related to a struggle between 
Alexander and the Bishop concerning their familial relationship. At the minimum, there are 
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two subjects directly involved in the struggle that, seen topographically, is embedded in and 
conditioned by the Bishop’s house where Alexander and his sister have to live. This clearly is 
a pertinent understanding of their polis but the social and spatial context of their politics can 
hardly be reduced to a household. Thus, in topological terms the polis of their struggle 
involves all the members of both the Bishop’s and Alexander’s extended families, their 
significant others, the symbolic and material settings of their daily lives, the prevailing moral 
values concerning parenthood, the discursively constituted truths about life and authority in 
stepfamilies, and so on. Polis thus understood is both people, places and objects involved, 
here and there, now, before and in the future, brought together by what is at stake in this 
politics – it is an inalienable part of the constitution of their politics. 
From Alexander’s side the struggle is about being uncomfortable with the proposed 
subject position as the Bishop’s son (‘what’ Alexander is). This is what animates his 
subjectivity (‘who’ Alexander is) that translates into political action. From the Bishop’s 
perspective at stake is his authority (‘what’ the Bishop is) that Alexander refuses to admit, 
leaving him (‘who’ the Biship is) with no recourse other than violent coercion devoid of true 
authority. That this is a struggle with history is evident from the dialogue between Alexander 
and the Bishop recalling their earlier conversation whereby Alexander had seemingly 
submitted under the Bishop’s will and accepted his moral guidance as legitimate. However, 
this time Alexander explicitly rejects the proposed familial relationship with the Bishop even 
though this comes at the cost of being punished for disobedience. Unlike the earlier occasion, 
this sequence can be seen as an instance of successful political agency by Alexander. 
Escaping from the position as the Bishop’s son provides Alexander, as well as his sister 
Fanny, with more freedom to develop and act as political subjects on grounds that extend 
beyond the topographic setting of the Bishop’s home. 
Authors’ copy. The original article has been published in Progress in Human Geography (first 
published on Jan. 22, 2013, doi: 10.1177/0309132512473869). For citation, please use the original. 
 
25 
 
Alexander’s successful political action, unfolding in the topological polis of the 
struggle, resulted from his agency as a political subject. In line with what we argue above, the 
condition of possibility of political agency is the subject’s relative autonomy vis-à-vis the 
social self that is at stake in the struggle. Here we read Alexander’s ways of referencing 
himself as an indication of the relative autonomy that allows Alexander to critically distance 
himself from the position of son that the dominant stepfather offers him. 
Ostensibly, what Alexander does is simple. By referencing himself in third person 
Alexander talks about his social self as it appears to the Bishop, thus taking subjectively 
distance from the object of the struggle. This allows him to underline that while he can, he 
doesn’t have to be “Alexander”. In referring to himself in first person Alexander talks about 
his social self as it appears to himself as the subject of this struggle. He further stresses the 
distinction in stating that “I have grown wiser since then”, thus indicating that he is now 
better equipped and ready for the struggle. In a similar vein he presents “Alexander” as the 
distanced object of the Bishop’s hatred but refers to “I” when talking about himself as the 
thinking subject. Alexander keeps to this two-fold referencing until it becomes evident that 
the discussion about their relationship is over. At this point Alexander starts to refer to 
himself only in the first person, thus indicating that he will not be confessing or receiving the 
punishment as the Bishop’s son “Alexander”. 
The struggle between Alexander and the Bishop may be particular in its harshness but 
we argue that the issues at stake are rather common. In our everyday lives we constantly 
encounter subject positions that we, adults and children alike, have to relate to, adopting, 
averting or molding them in particular circumstances. From Alexander’s case we learn that 
children, too, have potential to influence their subjectification even in very hierarchical and 
subordinating environments. In his mundane politics Alexander employs his relative 
autonomy to take distance from the Bishop’s conception of his social self, performing what 
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Couze Venn (2009: 5) calls “critical distancing … integral to the process of disidentification”. 
With this political action he challenges the Bishop whose authority appears nearly 
incontestable to most other members of the family and the wider community. 
As relating to subject positions takes different forms in diverse settings, political 
subjectivity is contextual and multiform. This is to say that unless living in total isolation, 
which hardly ever is the case, political subjects are plural and thus capable of positioning 
themselves differently in distinct political systems (Ortner, 2006; Venn, 2009). This 
dynamism may become overtly evident through the practices of naming and nicknaming, as is 
the case with our ongoing school ethnographic study with eleven- to twelve-year-old kids. 
Children are typically given nicknames by their family members, school mates and other peer 
groups. Often these names are agreeable to them, or even coined by the children themselves, 
which means that they readily accept and enact the distinct subject positions afforded by the 
names context-specifically. As one of the studied girls describes it, her school-self may lie 
down in a puddle to fool around, whereas her familial self committed to her mother’s norms 
and moralities could never do that.  
But, importantly, nicknames may also be unpleasant or even humiliating. In these cases 
children may lean on the plurality of their polises to avoid subordination related to an 
unpleasant subject position they cannot ignore. This may require constant effort, as was the 
case with another girl in our study. Toward the end of our field work with her, it turned out 
that she was called ‘hag’ by some of her classmates, but in a way not easily noticed in the 
polis. The subtle nicknaming occurs through a particular way of pronouncing her surname 
initial, making it sound like ‘hag’ (in Finnish ‘ämmä’). The nicknaming is easy to conceal 
because her surname initial is commonly used to distinguish her from another girl in the class 
with the same first name. Consequently, the teachers end up unknowingly using this 
nickname in a legitimate way and thus upholding the repressive subject position with which 
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the girl is constantly struggling at school. Yet, as we learned to our relief, she has means to 
cope with this harmful positioning through recourse to a nickname negotiated with those she 
is involved in her circus art hobby. By affiliating strongly with a polis she feels close to, she 
gains self-esteem as well as a rescue from the subject position offered to her at school every 
day. This subjective negotiation may not affect ‘what’ she is at school, but it certainly has a 
profound influence on ‘who’ she is, shaping her political subjectivity both presently and for 
the future. 
Struggle over such positioning is evident also in Alexander’s case. His own Ekdahl 
family and the Bishop’s stepfamily offer him different subject positions as a family member. 
In the episode analyzed, Alexander resorts to his experiences as the “Ekdahl subject” when 
practicing politics and struggling for who he is in the Bishop’s house. Yet, his aspiration to be 
a particular kind of political subject does not reflect the “self-understanding or reasoned 
action” of the liberal subject but, rather, it is based on “commitment to a certain construction 
of the public self: not a ‘subject position’ but a willful ‘stance’ whose content, form, and 
consequences are not entirely foreseeable by anyone” (Gambetti, 2005: 435). Precisely how 
Alexander, or the girls discussed above, act as political subjects in their respective polises is 
neither a triumph of voluntary action nor a fully predetermined social process, but a relational 
struggle on intersubjectively negotiated matters of importance. 
 
VI Conclusion 
 
In this paper we set out to develop tools for understanding political agency and political 
events as they unfold in the world. To this end we first discussed alternative understandings of 
the subject so as to grasp the possibility and scope of the subject’s autonomy as the ground for 
political subjectivity. Our goal has been to theorize the intersubjective constitution of the 
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subject in a manner that goes beyond both the post-structuralist dissolution of the subject and 
the isolated intersubjectivism characteristic to theories of recognition. To understand the ways 
in which political subjectivity translates into action that can be understood as political we 
have theorized political agency in terms of subjectivity related to subject positions offered in 
the flux of everyday life. Finally, to bring together political subject and action we 
conceptualized the topological settings of political agency in terms of polis. To illustrate the 
analytical potential of our approach we proposed a close reading of a scene from the movie 
Fanny and Alexander, partly based on the childhood memories of its director Ingmar 
Bergman, and extended the illustration with a brief reflection on our ongoing ethnographic 
work. 
Through the case of Alexander and the Bishop we have demonstrated some ways in 
which political agency may unfold in everyday circumstances. With children as a “critical 
case” (Flyvbjerg 2001), we argue that political agency along the conceptual lines of subject, 
action and polis can be studied in any type of event, social setting, or scale of action. What 
follows from this is that the meanings of the political may not be known in advance and thus 
need to be worked out empirically. However, to avoid the trap of “political everything”, the 
relational reading of political agency requires that in each case it is explicated why certain 
agencies are to be considered politically relevant, and how the polis in question shapes this 
relevance. This principle drives us toward exploring the phenomenology of political action, 
instead of asking ontologically what is, or is not, politics (cf. Dean, 2000; Barnett 2012b). 
To theoretically grasp political agency, we have proposed that it is analytically divided 
into political subject and political action, and contextualized in polis. Through Honneth’s 
thought we found Mead’s original idea of ‘I’ and ‘me’ as intertwined but distinguishable 
aspects of the subject a compelling theoretical grounding for the subject’s relative autonomy. 
For us such autonomy is the condition for any human political agency beyond determination 
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by the intersubjectively and discursively constituted identities and subject positions seated in 
existing social power relations. Without this autonomy political agency would always be 
seriously thwarted by the subject’s social constitution and it would be very difficult to account 
for unpredictable political acts. 
In our understanding the subject as ‘who’ is constituted in a dialogue between ‘I’ and 
‘me’ – the agent that is always now and here, and the agent as an object of reflection. ‘Me’ 
refers to the intersubjectively negotiated social self to which we ourselves and others relate to 
when seeking to define the subject as ‘what’. The fact that ‘I’ can not be reduced to ‘me’ is 
the source of subjectivity in human political agency. The latter may denote a variety of things 
in different situations and contexts, which we refer to as polis. These can be topographically 
and topologically constituted assemblages where political subjects have something at stake 
and where political agency unfolds. Conditioned by the subject’s relative autonomy, political 
agency is undetermined but limited by the conditions that the polis provides. By exploring 
how the varying dynamics and moralities of the polis enable and condition everyday political 
agency, we can see more clearly the connections between different actors and matters at stake 
as motivations and potentials for particular kind of political action. This, we suggest, will 
provide tools for understanding human political agency in many different kinds of settings 
and circumstances. 
The case of Alexander and the Bishop that we used as an illustration of our conception 
of political agency has its restrictions but also benefits. The scene focuses on a simplified 
struggle between two actors, making the power relations between the players apparent and the 
relevant polis easy to imagine. However, as the excerpts from our field work show, everyday 
political events are usually more complex and entangled, making it harder to explicate how 
things are political in the given case. Therefore, especially in empirical studies that target less 
explicit cases, it is important to strive for relational readings of the political so as not to ignore 
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those who do not appear as the most influential participants. As feminist and post-colonial 
scholars have underlined, only such analyses may capture the political agencies that in more 
traditional approaches tend to go unnoticed (e.g. England, 1994; Rose, 1997; Valentine, 2003; 
Popke, 2006).  
The approach we have developed facilitates the study of many different kinds of 
everyday political agency in situations and settings ranging from intimate experiences of 
subjectivity to reasoned environmental activism to geopolitical events on a world scale. What 
brings forth the political in each case is some question that gains importance to those involved 
in the respective polis. When polis is seen a key element in the politicization of issues and 
agencies, as we propose, it is clear that the latter may gain significance through developments 
and events that defy any simple relation to location or scale. Thus, topologically understood, 
the politicization of a given issue in a person’s everyday life (e.g. a sense of self-worth, 
sustainable diet, or gay rights) may occur at an intersection of personal experiences, public 
debates, social norms, institutional regulations, legal orders, and beyond. With such 
conception of polis we no longer need to resort to the categorical distinction between 
everyday politics (‘politics’) and institutional high politics (‘Politics’) but, instead, are more 
attuned to analyzing how the public and private, individual and collective, personal and 
institutional become enmeshed in the ways in which political agencies unfold in the world. 
This insight we propose as an inspiration for further theoretical and empirical work on the 
political agency and polises of children and adults alike. 
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Endnotes 
                                               
1 The direct quotations from the episode are from the English subtitles as available in a DVD released by the FS 
Film Ab. The original spoken language in the film is Swedish. The original lines in the order of quoting in the 
text are as follows: ”Biskopen”, “Alexander, min gosse”, “Biskopen talade och Alexander teg”, “Teg och 
skämdes, kanske, för sina lögner?”, “Jag har blivit klokare sedan dess”, “Du menar att du ljuger better”, 
“Ungefär so, ja”, “Jag tror att biskopen hatar Alexander. Det är vad jag tror”. The episode analysed here begins 
at 01:54:58 and ends at 02:04:28 in the DVD copy of the film. 
